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Abstract
Standard methods for differentially private training of deep neural networks replace
back-propagated mini-batch gradients with biased and noisy approximations to the
gradient. These modifications to training often result in a privacy-preserving model
that is significantly less accurate than its non-private counterpart.
We hypothesize that alternative training algorithms may be more amenable to
differential privacy. Specifically, we examine the suitability of direct feedback
alignment (DFA). We propose the first differentially private method for training
deep neural networks with DFA and show that it achieves significant gains in
accuracy (often by 10-20%) compared to backprop-based differentially private
training on a variety of architectures (fully connected, convolutional) and datasets.
1 Introduction
An unanswered question, with significant implications, is what is the best way to train deep networks
with differential privacy. The non-private setting has seen rapid advances in the state-of-the-art
while progress in the privacy-preserving setting has been lagging. Currently there are two promising
privacy-preserving approaches, each with its own drawbacks. (1) Knowledge distillation approaches,
such as PATE [27, 28], requires massive quantities of public data (i.e., data that will not receive
privacy protections) in addition to massive amounts of sensitive data (which will be protected). These
requirements limit their applicability. (2) Adaptations of stochastic gradient descent [1, 37, 3, 32,
23, 10, 9, 2], are more widely applicable but result in low accuracy compared to non-private models.
They operate by separately clipping the gradient for each example in a batch before aggregating
— that is, they clip then aggregate, instead of using the aggregate-then-clip approach common in
non-private training [14]. Noise is added to the gradient estimate and then parameters are updated.
The result is a biased and noisy gradient that causes final model accuracy to deteriorate [7].
In this paper, we focus on the setting where the entire dataset is sensitive and we seek alternatives to
differentially private stochastic gradient descent. Specifically, we consider the suitability of direct
feedback alignment (DFA) [26] for privacy-preserving training of artificial neural networks. DFA
is a biologically inspired alternative to backprop/SGD that is much more suitable for low-power
hardware [16, 11]. We propose the first differentially private algorithm for DFA. A careful analysis
shows privacy can be achieved by (i) clipping the activations and error signal after (not during) the
feed-forward phase, (ii) carefully choosing the error transport matrix, and (iii) adding Gaussian noise
to the update direction.
Empirical results on a variety of datasets show the following results. (1) Differentially private DFA
outperforms (by a wide margin) differentially private SGD on fully connected networks with various
activation functions. (2) Networks with fully connected layers stacked on top of convolutional layers
benefit significantly from a hybrid approach that combines DFA at the top layers with SGD at the
bottom layers (mirroring an earlier result in the non-private setting [16]).
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2 Related Work
Backpropagation (BP) [30] and stochastic gradient descent (SGD) have been essential tools for
training modern deep learning models in both non-private and private settings. In some communities,
such as cognitive neuroscience, debates about biological implausibility of BP (e.g., weight transport
problem [15, 20, 4]) motivated approaches such as feedback alignment (FA) [21], direct feedback
alignment (DFA) [26], and difference target propagation (DTP) [19], which introduce new learning
mechanisms for error feedback signals. Recent work [8, 25, 11] found that biologically plausible
learning algorithms generally underperform BP on convolutional neural networks, but hybrid DFA/BP
approaches can work well [16].
The first differentially private training algorithm for deep learning models was proposed by Shokri
and Shmatikov [31]. It relied on a distributed system in which participants jointly train a model
by exchanging perturbed SGD updates. However, it incurred a privacy cost that was too large
to be practical (e.g.,  values in the hundreds or thousands). Abadi et al. [1] proposed a training
algorithm that satisfied Renyi Differential Privacy [24], which allowed training of networks with
more practical privacy costs (epsilon values in the single digits). It modified SGD by individually
clipping the gradient of each example before aggregating them into batches, then adding appropriately-
scaled Gaussian noise, and then updating parameters as in standard SGD. This per-example-gradient
clipping was designed to control the influence of any single data point. They also introduced a
moment accountant to keep track of privacy protections due to Gaussian noise and subsampling (in
the selection of batches). Their method has generated substantial interest, and follow-up research [37,
3, 32, 23, 22, 10, 9, 2] investigated additional architectures and efficient clipping strategies. Clipping
gradients before aggregating them in batches is known to produce bias — the estimated mini-
batch gradient no longer points in the same direction as the true mini-batch gradient. As we show
experimentally, this bias already causes a degradation in model accuracy (even without noise addition).
In some special cases, gradient clipping can be avoided. Phan et al. [29] focused on learning auto-
encoders by perturbing the objective function. Xie et al. [35] showed that a differentially private
Wasserstein GAN [6] can be trained by clipping weights instead of gradients. PATE [27, 28] also
avoids gradient clipping, but requires a large non-sensitive dataset in order to operate.
To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first differentially private version of direct feedback
alignment.
3 Preliminaries
We next introduce our notation and provide background on DFA and (Renyi) Differential privacy.
3.1 Notation
We use bold-face uppercase letters (e.g., W) to represent matrices, bold-face lowercase letters (e.g.,
x) to represent vectors and non-bold lowercase letters (e.g., y) to represent scalars. Tensors of order 3
or higher (i.e., multidimensional arrays indexed by 3 or more variables) are represented in calligraphic
font (e.g,. W). We index vectors using square brackets (e.g., x[1] is the first component of the vector
x). For matrices, we use subscripts to identify entries (Wi,j is the entry in row i, column j).
We use the following notation to represent a dataset D and its constituent records: D = {di =
(xi,yi)}ni=1 is a set of n examples, where xi is a feature vector (e.g., image pixels) and yi is a one-hot
encoded target vector (i.e., to represent class k, yi[k] = 1 and all other components are 0).
3.2 Backpropagation and DFA
Direct Feedback Alignment [26] is best explained by showing how it deviates from backprop.
As an example, consider a feed-forward network fθ, consisting of L fully-connected layers with a
soft-max output (for a classification task). Let Wl ∈ Rnl×nl−1 and bl ∈ Rnl denote the weight and
bias of the lth layer in fθ, respectively. The feed-forward step of layer is defined by:
hl = φl(z
l) , zl = Wlhl−1 + bl , θ = {(Wl,bl)}Ll=1 , (1)
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Figure 1: Comparison of different error transportation configurations
where zl ∈ Rnl is the pre-activation and hl ∈ Rnl is the (post-) activation of the layer obtained by
applying the activation function φl element-wise on zl. In our notation, h0 = x denotes the input
record. In the final layer (with softmax activation), the kth output is hL[k] = exp(z
L[k])∑
j exp(z
L[j])
, which can
be interpreted as the probability estimate for class k. Continuing our example, suppose the network is
to be trained with cross-entropy loss. That is, if fθ(x) ≡ yˆ is the output vector for input x with true
class label y, the cross-entropy loss for that record is L(hL) = −∑k y[k] log yˆ[k].
In BP, the gradient of L w.r.t. the parameter Wl is computed using the chain rule and updated as
follows:
δzl =
∂hl
∂zl
∂zl+1
∂hl
∂L
∂zl+1
=
{(
(Wl+1)ᵀδzl+1
)
 φ′l(zl) if l < L,
yˆ − y if l = L,
(2)
∂L
∂Wl
=
∂zl
∂Wl
∂L
∂zl
= δzl(hl−1)ᵀ (3)
Wl ←Wl − η ∂L
∂Wl
; bl ← bl − ηδzl (4)
where η is the step size,  is an element-wise multiplication operator and φ′l denotes the derivative of
the activation function. Equation (2) shows that the backward error signal δzl for layer l is computed
using the signal δzl+1 propagated from the layer above. Starting from the output layer, the error
information propagates backward through the network from layer to layer. Notice that the error signal
δzl requires the transpose of forward weight matrix Wl+1. In other words, Wl+1 appears in both
feed-forward and backward paths.
DFA makes two modifications to the backward path of BP (and only the backward path). First, for
each layer, it replaces Wl+1 in the backward path with a random feedback weight matrix Bl+1
(chosen at the beginning of training). The entries of Bl+1 are randomly sampled from a probability
distribution such as the Gaussian distribution and then are fixed throughout the training process (i.e.
they do not get updated/learned). The second change introduced by DFA is that instead of propagating
the error signal backward through the layers, the error signal at each layer depends directly on δzL,
which is the error signal of the output layer. Due to the special importance of δzL, we denote this
error signal by e (which equals yˆ − y for cross-entropy loss over softmax output). Mathematically,
the error signal δzl at layer l is:
δzl =
(
Bl+1e
)
 φ′l(zl) . (5)
Compared to Equation 2, (Wl+1)ᵀ is replaced with Bl+1 while δzl+1 is replaced with e. Plugging
Equation 5 into Equation 3 and then 4, one arrives at the DFA update equation for Wl (the weights
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used in the feed-forward pass) and bl:
Wl ←Wl − η
((
Bl+1e
)
 φ′(zl)
)
(hl−1)ᵀ ; bl ← bl − η
((
Bl+1e
)
 φ′(zl)
)
Graphically, the distinction between BP and DFA is illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b.
3.3 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a formal notion of privacy that provides strong privacy protection in sensitive
data analysis. It bounds the influence that one record can have on the output of a randomized
algorithm.
We say two datasets D1 and D2 are neighbors if D1 can be obtained from D2 by changing one record
and write D1∼D2 to denote this relationship.
Definition 1 ((, δ)-DP [13, 12]). Given privacy parameters  ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0, a randomized mechanism
(algorithm)M satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if for every set S ⊆ range(M) and for all pairs of
neighboring datasets D1∼D2,
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[M(D2) ∈ S] + δ .
The probability is only with respect to the randomness inM.
In differentially private deep learning, a mechanism corresponds to the set of parameter updates
from processing one minibatch. Since training involves many minibatch updates, it is important to
accurately track the combined privacy leakage from all minibatches used. In this work, we use Rényi
Differential Privacy (RDP) [24] to track privacy leakage. RDP uses its own parameters, but after
training finishes, the RDP parameters can be converted to the , δ parameters of Definition 1. RDP
relies on the concept of Rényi divergence:
Definition 2 (Rényi Divergence). Let P1 and P2 be probability distributions over a set Ω and let α ∈
(1,∞). Rényi α-divergence Dα is defined as: Dα(P1 ‖ P2) = 1α−1 log(Ex∼P2 [P1(x)αP2(x)−α]).
Rényi differential privacy requires two parameters: a moment α and a parameter  that bounds the
moment.
Definition 3 ((α, )-RDP [24]). Given a privacy parameter  ≥ 0 and an α ∈ (1,∞), a randomized
mechanismM satisfies (α, )-Rényi differential privacy (RDP) if for all D1 and D2 that differ on the
value of one record, Dα(M(D1) ‖ M(D2)) ≤  .
A simple way to achieve (α, )-RDP is to take a vector-valued deterministic function f and add
appropriately scaled Gaussian noise as follows. The scale of the noise depends on the sensitivity of f .
Definition 4 (L2 sensitivity). Let L2 sensitivity of f , denoted by ∆f is equal to supD1∼D2 ||f(D1)−
f(D2)||2, where the supremum is taken over all pairs of neighboring datasets.
Lemma 1 (Gaussian Mechanism [24]). Let f be a function. Let α > 1 and  > 0. Let M be
the mechanism that, on input D, returns f(D) + N(0, σ2I), where σ2 =
α∆2f
2 . Then M satisfies
(α, )-RDP.
The composition theorem of RDP states that if M1, . . . ,Mk are mechanisms and each Mi satisfies
(α, i)-RDP, then their combined privacy leakage satisfies (α,
∑
i i)-RDP [24]. The parameters of
RDP can be converted into those of (, δ)-DP through the following conversion result [24].
Lemma 2 (Conversion to (, δ)-DP [24]). IfM satisfies (α, )-RDP, it satisfies (′, δ′)-differential
privacy whenever ′ ≥ + log(1/δ)α−1 and δ′ ≥ δ.
The following lemma states that the privacy guarantee of an (α, )-RDP mechanismM is amplified
when it is applied on poisson subsampled data.
Lemma 3 (Subsampled Mechanism and Privacy Amplification for RDP [33]). For a random-
ized mechanism M and a dataset D, define M ◦ Sq as (i) sample a subset B ⊆ D (with
q = |B|/|D|), by sampling without replacement (ii) apply M on B. Then if M satisfies
(α, (α))-RDP with respect to B, M ◦ Sq satisfies (α, ′(α))-RDP with respect to D for any
integer α ≥ 2, where ′(α) ≤ 1α−1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
min
{
4(e(2) − 1), 2e(2), e(2)(e(∞) − 1)2} +∑α
l=3
(
α
l
)
qle(l−1)(l) min{2, (e(∞) − 1)j}).
4
Algorithm 1: DP-DFA with activation clipping
Input: A feed-forward network fθ = {(Wl,bl)}Ll=1, upper bounds γl on derivative of
activation functions, spectral norm bounds βl, clipping thresholds τe, τh, stepsize η,
noise scale σ, minibatch size m, number of iterations T .
1 for l = 1 to L do
2 Intialize Bl, then normalize: Bl = βlBl/‖Bl‖2 // spectral normalization
3 end
4 for T iterations do
5 Create a minibatch of size m by sampling without replacement
6 S ← indices of records in the mini-batch
7 for i in S do
8 for layer l = 1 to L− 1 do // feed-forward phase
9 zli = W
lhl−1i + b
l; hli = φl(z
l
i); // process record i
10 end
11 yˆi ← softmax(WLhL−1i + bL)
12 ei = clipτe(yˆi − yi) // error clipping
13 end
14 for l = L to 1 do // activation clipping and parameter updates
15 Wl ←Wl − η
(
N (0, σ2I) + 1m
∑
i∈S
(
(Bl+1ei) φ′l(zli)
)
clipτh(h
l−1
i )
ᵀ
)
16 bl ← bl − η
(
N (0, σ2I) + 1m
∑
i∈S
(
Bl+1ei
)
 φ′l(zli)
)
17 end
18 end
4 Differentially Private DFA
In this section, we propose a differentially private version of direct feedback alignment. Given a
positive constant c, the clipping function shrinks the norm of a vector until it is at most c. Formally,
clipc(v) = min(c, ‖v‖2) v‖v‖2 . Our algorithm1 for privatizing DFA has several components: (1)
first, we require that the (sub)derivatives of each activation function φl be bounded by a constant
γl (i.e., |φ′l(v)| ≤ γl for all scalars v). This is true for the most commonly used activations such as
ReLU, sigmoid, tanh, etc.; (2) then we construct the feedback matrices Bl with spectral norm (largest
singular value) equal to βl (an algorithm parameter); the entries ofBl are sampled independently from
the standard Gaussian distribution, and then this matrix is rescaled by a constant so that ||Bl|| = βl;
(3) we construct a mini-batch of size m by sampling without replacement; (4) after the feed-forward
phase completes, we compute the clipped version (with parameter τh) of the post-activation hl of
each layer and we also clip with parameter τe the error vector e; (5) we then add Gaussian noise to
the DFA mini-batch update direction. The full algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
4.1 Privacy Accounting
At the end of the day, a user is interested in computing the RDP parameters of Algorithm 1 and then
converting it into the , δ parameters of differential privacy. We now describe this process. The T
iterations of the algorithm correspond to the sequential composition of T mechanims M1, . . . ,MT ,
where Mj applies the Gaussian Mechanism (lines 15 and 16) on sampled data (the minibatch) of
iteration j of the algorithm. Let ∆ be the sensitivity of the combined computations (for all layers
combined) of 1m
∑
i∈S
(
(Bl+1ei) φ′l(zli)
)
clipτh(h
l−1
i )
ᵀ and 1m
∑
i∈S
(
Bl+1ei
)
 φ′l(zli) (we
show how to compute this in Section 4.2). The Gaussian noise (Lemma 1) added to these quantities
provides (α, α∆2/(2σ2))-RDP. The second RDP parameter is further reduced by applying Lemma
3 since the batch was chosen randomly. The second parameter is then multiplied by T to account
1This algorithm is for the “modify a record” definition of neighbors in differential privacy. For the add/remove
version, we replace fixed minibatch sizes with Poisson sampling, use the Poisson amplification result [38], and
add up (instead of averaging) the updates on lines 15 and 16 in Algorithm 1.
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for all iterations. Finally, the resulting RDP parameters are converted to (, δ)-differential privacy
parameters using Lemma 2.
4.2 Sensitivity Computation
Thus, all that is left is to compute the sensitivity ∆ζl of ζl ≡
1
m
∑
i∈S
(
(Bl+1ei) φ′l(zli)
)
clipτh(h
l−1
i )
ᵀ and the sensitivity ∆ξl of ξl ≡ 1m
∑
i∈S
(
Bl+1ei
)

φ′l(z
l
i) under the "modify one record" version of neighboring datasets (Secction 3.3).
Once we have those quantities, the overall sensitivity ∆ (used in Section 4.1) is clearly equal to
(L∆2ζl + L∆
2
ξl
)1/2.
Sensitivity for Fully Connected Networks. For fully connected networks, we note that changing a
record only changes one term in the summations, so the sensitivity of ζ` is equal to
∆ζl ≤
2
m
∥∥∥((Bl+1ei) φ′l(zli)) clipτh(hl−1i )ᵀ∥∥∥F = 2m∥∥∥(Bl+1ei) φ′l(zli)∥∥∥2‖clipτh(hl−1i )‖2
≤ 2
m
γlτh
∥∥∥Bl+1ei∥∥∥
2
=
2
m
γlτhβl+1τe
while for ξ`, a similar computation for sensitivity yields:
∆ξl ≤
2
m
∥∥∥(Bl+1ei) φ′l(zli)∥∥∥
2
≤ 2
m
γl
∥∥∥Bl+1ei∥∥∥
2
=
2
m
γlβl+1τe
So the overall sensitivity of one iteration, to be used in the privacy accounting in Section 4.1, is
∆ ≤ 2γlβl+1τe
√
(1 + τ2h)L/m.
Handling Convolutional Layers. Although DFA can be extended to convolutional layers, several
results suggest that it is better to use a hybrid BP/DFA approach instead. The first reason is that in the
non-private setting, it has been observed that DFA does not perform well with convolutional layers
[16]. Second, we observed that this rule sometimes carries over to the privacy-preserving setting. The
sensitivity is much larger than for fully connected layers.2
In the non-private setting, Han et al. [16] suggested a hybrid approach that we can carry over to the
privacy-preserving setting. This hybrid approach can be visualized in Figure 1c. Consider a network
with layers 1, . . . , ` being convolutional and layers `+ 1, . . . , L being fully connected.
For the fully connected layers (i.e., `+ 1, . . . , L), we use the differentially private DFA updates from
lines 15 and 16 from Algorithm 1. Given an overall target sensitivity C, we choose the algorithm
parameters so that the sensitivity of each fully connected layer is C/
√
L.
For the convolutional layers (i.e., 1, . . . , `), the actual gradient at layer l is ∂L
∂Wl
= ∂z
`+1
∂Wl
∂L
∂z`+1
.
However, since we did not back-propagate from L down to `+ 1, the partial derivative ∂L
∂z`+1
is not
available by the time the algorithm is processing the convolutional layers. Hence we replace ∂L
∂z`+1
with its DFA counterpart δz`+1 =
(
B`+2e
)
 φ′`+1(z`+1) (see Equation 5). Meanwhile, ∂z
`+1
∂Wl
can
be computed using back-propagation starting at layer `+ 1. Putting this together, the differentially
private update step for convolutional layers that should be performed on lines 15 and 16 is:
Wl ←Wl − η
(
N (0, σ2I) + 1
m
∑
i∈S
clipτ
(
∂z`+1i
∂Wl
δz`+1i
))
bl ← bl − η
(
N (0, σ2I) + 1
m
∑
i∈S
clipτ
(
∂z`+1i
∂bl
δz`+1i
))
where the clipping threshold τ is chosen so that the sensitivity of each convolutional layer is C/
√
L.
Since each network layer has sensitivity C/
√
L, their combined L2 sensitivity is (C2/L + · · · +
C2/L)1/2 = C.
2For completeness, we include the details in the supplementary material.
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(a) Test Accuracy, σ = 0.01. At
δ = 10−5, the  values at epochs
50, 100, 150, 200 are 4.43, 6.43,
8.07, and 9.49, respectively.
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(b) Test Accuracy, σ = 0.03. At
δ = 10−5, the  values at epochs
50, 100, 150, 200 are 1.28, 1.82,
2.25, and 2.61, respectively.
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(c) Test Accuracy, σ = 0.05. At
δ = 10−5, the  values at epochs
50, 100, 150, 200 are 0.75, 1.07,
1.31, and 1.52, respectively.
Figure 2: Differentially private convolutional network experiments on Fashion-MNIST. Test Accuracy
is reported after every training epoch.
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(a) Test Accuracy σ = 0.01
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(c) Test Accuracy σ = 0.05
Figure 3: Differentially private convolutional network experiments on CIFAR 10. Test Accuracy is
reported after every training epoch. Privacy parameters at different epochs are the same as in Figure 2
5 Exerimental Results
In this section, we compare differentially private DFA (DP DFA) to differentially private BP (DP BP)
[1]. It is first worth mentioning some struggles with DP BP reported in prior work (e.g., [1, 7]). Earlier
work used pre-trained convolutional layers that were never updated [1] so that those experiments only
performed DP BP over 2 or 3 fully connected layers. Subsequent work (e.g., [7]) used more complex
networks (Inception V3) that were pretrained; however, DP BP caused their accuracy to decrease
almost immediately. For these reasons, we use networks in similar complexity to [1]. However, we
train all the layers in our networks and furthermore show that the models can actually be trained from
scratch.3
We evaluate performance on Fashion MNIST (FMNIST [34]) and CIFAR10 [18]. In all cases,
the differentially private update directions are sent to the Adam optimizer [17] (with parameters
η = 0.001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999). In all experiments, the β parameter for DP DFA was set to 0.9
and the error clipping threshold was τe = 0.1. The activation clipping threshold τh was then set so
that the overall sensitivity matched that of DP BP.
5.1 Convolutional Networks.
For convolutional networks, we use a similar setup to [1]. The architecture uses 2 convolutional layers
(5x5 kernels and 64 channels each with 2x2 max pools) followed by 2 fully connected layers (384
units each), and the output layer uses softmax. Following [1], we set the sensitivity for each iteration
at 3 (so even the DP DFA uses their setting) and a mini-batch of size 512. For DP BP, following [1],
the layers use ReLU activation. ReLU is not recommended for DFA in the non-private case [26] so
for DP DFA we use tanh for convolutional layers and sigmoid for fully connected layers (we use this
setting even when using the differentially private DFA/BP hybrid).
This setup ensures that each iteration and each epoch of DP BP has the same privacy impact as DP
DFA. The results for Fashion MNIST are shown in Figure 2. At various noise levels σ, we see that
3This eliminates the temptation of practitioners to misuse differential privacy by pre-training on private data
and only afterwards using differentially private updates.
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(a) Testing accuracy, σ = 0.01. At δ = 10−5, the  values at epochs 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300 are
9.77, 13.75, 17.8, 21.3, 23.74, and 26.19, respectively. (left: Fashon-MNIST, right CIFAR10)
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(b) Testing accuracy σ = 0.05. At δ = 10−5, the  values at epochs 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300 are
1.03, 1.46, 1.8,2.1,2.35, and 2.59, respectively. (left: Fashon-MNIST, right CIFAR10)
Figure 4: Differentially private fully connected network on Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR 10
a large gap between differentially private BP and the non-private network. Differentially private
DFA outperforms DP BP, with the hybrid approach clearly outperforming both, and doing a better
job of closing the gap with the non-private network. Corresponding results for CIFAR 10, which is
known to be much harder for differentially private training, is shown in Figure 3. We see the same
qualitative results, where the differentially private hybrid approach significantly outperforms the other
privacy-preserving methods.
5.2 Fully Connected Networks.
For fully connected networks, we use the following architectures. For Fashion MNIST, the network
consists of two hidden layers, with 128 and 256 hidden units, respectively. These layers use the
sigmoid activation function and we use softmax for the output layer. We use a minibatch of size 128
and the sensitivity of each iteration is set to 2. As usual, the privacy impact of each iteration and
epoch is the same for DP BP and for DP DFA. Since CIFAR 10 is a more complex dataset, we use a
more complex network with 3 hidden layers of 256 units each. The results are shown in Figure 4. We
see that the accuracy of all networks saturate fairly quickly with DP DFA achieving good accuracy
with fewer epochs than DP BP, suggesting that we can use it to train more accurate networks with a
smaller privacy budget.
6 Conclusion
Recent advances in differential privacy have shown that privacy-preserving training of complex
non-convex models is feasible. However, there is still a significant gap between accuracy of these
models and application requirements. In this paper, we consider the possibility that alternatives
to backprop may be more suitable for training privacy-preserving models. We proposed the first
differentially private version of direct feedback alignment (DFA), a biologically inspired training
algorithm.
Although the effects of DFA are not well-understood even in the non-private setting, its behavior in
the privacy-preserving setting (when compared to differentially private SGD) and potential use in
low-power hardware show that DFA merits increased attention and theoretical study.
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